The immense potential and unrealised promise of BRICS

When it was established in 2009, the BRICS—comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa—was envisioned as the first-ever coalition of its kind of emerging economies poised to reshape the liberal international order by plugging the institutional and operational gaps in the international system. Heralded as a voice of the Global South, the group sought not only to challenge the dominance of stagnated Western-led institutions but also to offer an alternative development paradigm. Yet, for over a decade and a half, the BRICS seemingly struggled to realise its ambitions, often hampered by internal divisions, competing national interests, and a lack of institutional coherence.

The narrative began to shift in favour of the BRICS in 2024, with the group expanding its membership across continents. The admission of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, and Indonesia signalled a strategic pivot toward a more inclusive BRICS that was cognizant of the diverse voices and concerns of the countries of the 'Global South'. The inclusion of Southeast Asian states, such as Indonesia, and partner countries, including Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, suggests that BRICS is expanding its core beyond economic cooperation.

The BRICS enlargement has also renewed optimism about the group’s potential to influence global economic and institutional architecture. With the original members themselves accounting for 35 per cent of global GDP in 2024—surpassing the G7 developed economies in purchasing power parity terms—the additions boast of BRICS’s economic and political leverage. 

The bloc has built parallel financial institutions that many see as a rival to the Bretton Woods system. The New Development Bank (NDB) aims to finance sustainable infrastructure in emerging economies, while the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) provides financial safety nets and local currency support in times of liquidity crises. While these initiatives mirror those of the World Bank and IMF, their actual impact remains constrained by limited capital bases and operational scope, and this is justifiably so, considering their nascent stage.

BRICS has also been pushing for de-dollarisation, which would involve substituting another currency for the US dollar to pay for international transactions in trade or to maintain as part of a country's chief foreign reserves. Initially, the idea was to create a common BRICS currency, but this has evolved into promoting their own national currencies. China’s Yuan and India’s Rupee have seen limited adoption in this context; structural limitations in convertibility and trust persist. Without mutual economic interdependence or shared financial architecture, these efforts are likely to remain fragmented.

These pursuits have unfortunately painted BRICS as an anti-Western bloc, especially with the inclusion of states like Iran and Russia, which have openly challenged the Western liberal order and defied the norms of international diplomacy. Such a characterisation oversimplifies both the bloc's internal diversity and its intentions. Many BRICS communiqués emphasise reforming—not dismantling—the liberal international order (LIO). Member states have consistently called for more inclusive multilateralism, a greater voice for the Global South in institutions like the UNSC, IMF, and WTO, and stricter adherence to international law. 

In short, BRICS, as a representative voice of the Global South, is unhappy with international institutions rooted in mid-twentieth-century global politics and economy, which excessively represent the 'West', and are unwilling to adjust to the new reality of the 'rise of the rest' and accommodate them. To that extent, BRICS must be seen as an 'anti-status quo', progressive, and inclusive bloc.

Furthermore, the idea that BRICS is working to replace the LIO makes two assumptions, one about the grouping itself and the other about the liberal international order, both of which are misplaced.

First is the assumption that all major regional groups are monolithic. Assuming BRICS is a monolithic counterweight to the West overlooks the divergent national interests and regional priorities of its members. While members within a specific geographical area may likely have more commonalities than differences, this does not always guarantee cohesion, as the European Union and ASEAN have shown.

Unlike the European Union, which shares geographical contiguity and a strong foundational legal framework, the BRICS lacks a shared history, political ideology, and institutional enforcement mechanism. India and China, for instance, remain strategic competitors with two completely different political systems. Similarly, tensions exist between Gulf countries, such as the UAE and Iran, which complicate intra-BRICS dynamics. Critics also overlook the fact that it took the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) forty-two years to evolve into the European Union. Expecting BRICS to turn the tables in just fifteen years is harsh.

The second assumption is to assume that the BRICS’s problem is wholly with the LIO. While it is true that they share a desire to transform the liberal international order, what BRICS desires is more democratisation within the existing global order, with increased roles for states currently excluded from decision-making. BRICS Summit statements often call for more inclusive multilateralism and the upholding of international law, as well as reaffirmation of support for the LIO's institutions, such as the UN and WTO. BRICS member countries are working to ensure the LIO adheres to its core purposes, values, and principles, and making the multipolar world order more inclusive and egalitarian.

However, even if there is such an intention, this would not be easy to achieve. A power-legitimacy framework offers insight into the structural limitations of BRICS. As membership grows, so does the bloc's aggregate power—but at the cost of internal complexity. Expanded diversity introduces more veto points, reduces consensus-building efficiency, and increases the risk of institutional gridlock. New members may be reluctant to conform to collective rules (as was witnessed in the case of a common BRICS currency), especially when political systems, economic models, and strategic alignments vary so widely.

Still, there have been concerns raised about how BRICS is already impacting the regional order. Some had opined that ASEAN would suffer collateral damage from BRICS expansion, especially as some of its members seek membership of the group. 

The fear is that overlapping memberships may dilute ASEAN’s consensus-based approach and fragment its cohesion. However, this perspective underestimates the flexible and non-binding nature of Asian regionalism and its operational mechanisms.

It is generally acknowledged that region and order-building in Asia has moved along a different path to that taken by Europe. Unlike the EU’s legalistic integration and supranational frameworks, Asia's regional institutions operate on the principles of "soft regionalism" and institutional “soft balancing” — emphasising non-interference, informality, and a consensus-based approach. The "ASEAN Way" prioritises process over outcome, allowing states to hedge between multiple alignments. India’s ‘multi-alignment’ policy seems to be working as a guidebook for its peers in the ASEAN region as well. 

While countries such as Indonesia are engaging all major stakeholders, they are no longer ‘passively’ hedging. Instead, they are showcasing more confidence in dealing with big powers. Institutions like APEC and the ASEAN+ frameworks, such as ARF, EAS, RCEP, and ADMM+, reflect this modality, accommodating divergent interests while avoiding attempts to tie themselves to any rigid alliance mechanism of any kind.

In this context, BRICS may not fundamentally threaten ASEAN's centrality, but could instead serve as a complementary mechanism for greater global economic and diplomatic engagement. States such as Indonesia, Malaysia, or Thailand may simultaneously benefit from BRICS investment and ASEAN’s multilateral diplomacy, provided they refrain from using BRICS to advance their domestic political agendas.

The development of APEC reflects these realities. Facing a myriad of concerns and interests, those pushing for APEC had little option but to be as accommodating as possible to cater to these diverse concerns and interests. As a result, APEC's institutional structure was similarly impacted as it sought to incorporate and address the many concerns and interests of its potential members, among which included ASEAN members' preference for a more informal structure.

The Indo-Pacific regional construct is yet to achieve much institutionalisation due to these very same challenges, and it is expected that the same will happen as BRICS begins to admit ASEAN members, or those that are comfortable with the ASEAN way of regionalism.

Rather than a revolutionary force, BRICS should be viewed as a transitional coalition of the willing, attempting to adjust the international institutional architecture to reflect shifting power dynamics, without necessarily replacing the liberal international order. Its success will depend not just on economic weight, but on the credibility, functionality, and legitimacy of the institutions it builds. It may even require a helping hand from ASEAN, for while BRICS has successfully identified the gaps in LIO institutions, it is not yet equipped to fill them. The induction of ASEAN members states can be beneficial towards that endeavour, as the ASEAN institutional model can be a good toolkit to fill in those missing pieces. Until then, BRICS remains a forum of immense potential—yet unrealised promise. 

This piece draws from the article titled “Assessing the impact of an expanded BRICS on the international order: The role of power and legitimacy” published in the South African Journal of International Affairs (SAJIA).

Dr Peter Brian M Wang is a career civil servant with the Malaysian Government. He currently serves as Deputy Head at the Centre for Economics and Public Finance Studies at the National Institute of Public Administration (INTAN), Malaysia. 

Dr Rahul Mishra is Associate Professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India, and a Senior Research Fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Centre of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University, Thailand.