Ambiguities cloud Australia-Indonesia security treaty

On February 6, the Australian and Indonesian governments signed a new security treaty modelled on the now abrogated 1995 Agreement on Maintaining Security, and reaffirming the 2006 Lombok Treaty and the 2024 Defense Cooperation Agreement.

Unlike previous treaties, this treaty obligates bilateral consultation at leadership level in response to security threats, identifies opportunities, undertakes mutually beneficial security activities, and considers joint measures to address contemporary security threats.

It can be argued that this treaty represents a significant evolution in bilateral ties, in improving the bilateral security relationship, and in confidence building between the two countries.

Notably, the treaty broadens areas of cooperation to include hybrid threats. In recent years, threats such as cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic coercion, have gained prominence amid growing competition between the United States and China. The willingness of countries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia to support and back criminal hackers, and of the United States to use economic relations as tools of coercion necessitates more cooperation, especially among middle powers that can be caught in the crossfire.

This makes this treaty timely and important for the security of both Australia and Indonesia. Yet there are several missing elements that have the potential to undermine the treaty's long-term efficacy.

First, the treaty is ambiguous on what is meant by "mutually beneficial security activities". It undoubtedly includes cooperating in humanitarian and disaster relief, and most likely maritime security and safety. While the vagueness of the terms assists Indonesia in managing domestic critique, there is nothing in the treaty that compels Indonesia to assist Australia militarily. Essentially, it allows flexibility but risks inaction.

For example, should Australia have to pass Indonesian waters in the event of war, Indonesia would not be obligated to grant passage. This vagueness could lead to misaligned expectations and be a source of potential friction, especially as Indonesia has already signed a comprehensive strategic partnership with China and is currently a member of BRICS.

Second, like it or not, the relationship between Australia and Indonesia, while greatly improved in recent years, is still far from ideal. Most Indonesians don’t pay attention to Australia's foreign policy and very few believe Australia is Indonesia's closest ally. Lingering wounds from the 1999 East Timor independence referendum weigh on the bilateral relationship. Furthermore, Indonesia often prioritises relations with China due to strong trade relations between the two countries. Similarly, few Australians believe Indonesia is Australia's best friend in Asia. As a result, much work remains to be done and the treaty might not significantly change perceptions. Grassroots confidence building measures through educational and other people-to-people exchanges are critical to bridge the gap.

Third, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto is a wild card. Unlike previous presidents, Prabowo ignores many historical precedents of Indonesia's foreign policy. In signing a joint statement with China in 2024, he implicitly acknowledged China's nine-dash line claim over the South China Sea, in a major departure from Indonesia's longstanding policy of denying any overlapping claim with China in the South China Sea.

Another example was his decision to join as a full member of BRICS, a group that includes non-Western powers Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and which is seen as dominated by China. It remains an open question whether Indonesia is sleepwalking into an alignment with China.

Finally, Prabowo’s acceptance of US President Donald Trump's invitation to join his Board of Peace, aimed at solving the Israel-Palestinian conflict, drew many domestic objections. In the end, facing mounting criticism, he declared he would pull Indonesia out of the Board of Peace if it fails to deliver tangible benefits for Palestinians. The episode again highlighted his impulsive style.

It is not surprising that as a result, various analysts have labelled Prabowo’s foreign policy as unprincipled and directionless, lacking a considered foundation, and personalistic and self-interested. While one may make an argument that Prabowo's foreign policy is simply pragmatic, his impulsiveness, especially on touchy subjects, makes it more likely that he may overpromise on the treaty, leaving relevant departments to clean up the aftermath. Not to mention that this unpredictability could complicate joint responses to any manifest threats, as the treaty specifies that both Ausralian and Indonesian leaders need to be in constant consultation in the event a tangible threat does emerge.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that both Australia and Indonesia depend on each other as geographic neighbors sharing one of the longest maritime borders in the world. They face common challenges that may be managed together in this treaty, such as climate change, illegal fishing, and transnational crime. The treaty may deliver progress for both countries in the long term, but success hinges on addressing (or rather accepting) ambiguities, fostering public trust, and navigating Prabowo's leadership, which will require sustained effort to translate high expectations into reality.

Yohanes Sulaiman is associate professor in international relations at Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani.