Authoritarian risks in Indonesia’s foreign policy tilt

The "free and active" principle, which lies at the heart of Indonesian foreign policy, is taking a new direction under the current administration. Experts predicted that the country's foreign policy would undergo significant changes under President Prabowo Subianto. The current administration was expected to adopt a more assertive foreign policy that promoted Indonesia's presence internationally, shifting from former president Joko Widodo’s focus on domestic issues.

The annual policy statement by Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono, delivered on January 14, appropriately calls for a re-evaluation of the meaning of the longstanding "free and active" principle. Delivering the annual statement is a tradition in which the minister assesses global challenges and outlines the country’s foreign policy outlook for the year ahead.

This year, the statement highlighted the need for a more flexible, responsive foreign policy to address contemporary challenges. 

Sugiono described the current global geopolitical landscape as one characterised by uncertainty, fragmentation, weakened global governance, and the blurring of clear boundaries between domestic and international issues. He noted that the existing global order is fragile, with countries increasingly focusing on national interests rather than collective action. 

His statement also reflected the extent of the government’s anxiety over the growing instability of the  geopolitical environment, amid intense competition and unpredictability between the great powers, fuelling the breakdown of multilateral systems and disregard for international law.

Sugiono described this global landscape as a "multiplex" order of diverse interests, key players, and overlapping rules, where cooperation is increasingly transactional rather than grounded in shared principles. Additionally, the US and China, among others, have weaponised trade and global value chains to protect their national interests. In this environment, Indonesian diplomacy must skilfully navigate an unpredictable world, while practicing strategic caution and emphasising domestic priorities.

In response to these challenges, Sugiono cast the “free and active” foreign policy not as a passive instrument for avoiding sides in geopolitical rivalries; rather, he sees it as a means of acting  strategically to further Indonesia’s national interests. The call to reevaluate the “free and active” principle makes sense, as its contemporary relevance is widely debated. Framed on the eve of the Cold War, and as Indonesia fought for its independence,  it was designed for a different set of challenges to those facing the country and the world today. 

There are several characteristics to the “free and active” principle: "free" is commonly interpreted as advocacy of independence, non-alignment, and neutralilty amid great power rivalry; "active" is seen as entailing a commitment to energetically promote global peace and equality.

Although Indonesia has espoused the "free and active" principle since soon after the declaration of independence, each government has interpreted and applied it in different ways, influenced by global issues, the unique circumstances of each administration, the priorities of leaders, and the dictates of a variety of domestic interests and forces. This has imbued it in practice with considerable flexibility.

However, the current administration’s a willingness to revisit the principle feeds concerns that a new interpretation could be used to justify actions that depart from the original spirit.

Sugiono’s promised reevaluation begs several questions. To what extent will Indonesian foreign policy be shaped by a new-found pragmatism and by transactional interests? How will Indonesia uphold its commitment to multilateralism, a rules-based order and international law when faced with conflicts involving its domestic interests? How willing is the Indonesian government to accept the consequences of a principled stance to international relations? Additionally, does the expansion of defence and security cooperation agreements with other nations, such as Australia, signal a more flexible interpretation of Indonesia’s "free and active" foreign policy?

Recent actions by President Prabowo suggest Indonesia's foreign policy has shifted away from what might be termed a modern orthodox interpretation of the "free and active” approach.

The President's decisive move to join the controversial Trump-led Board of Peace, exemplifies this change and has drawn criticism for straying from Indonesia’s core foreign policy principles, especially relating to independence and neutrality.

A key issue for domestic critics is whether this signifies a strategic alignment and a shift away from the tradition of non-alignment. Does it suggest a new flexibility in Indonesia's foreign policy, driven by pragmatism? Additionally, the move seems to contradict the minister’s assertion that Indonesia should focus on strengthening its national resilience and emphasising an independent foreign policy course to avoid becoming entangled in escalating global rivalries.

What is more concerning is the potential for Indonesian foreign policy to be dominated by the personal views of the President. This scenario presents a significant risk because it can undermine decision-making processes within domestic institutions and weaken the relevant ministries, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On a global level, the personalisation of foreign policy could harm Indonesia’s relationships with key partners and reduce its influence. The current President's desire for recognition in international forums raises further concerns. In short, there is a serious risk that Indonesia could become increasingly authoritarian, not only in its domestic decision-making but also in its foreign policy approach.

Poppy S. Winanti, Professor of International Relations at Universitas Gadjah Mada.